In April 2025, China imposed new export control over seven rare earth elements and permanent magnets obtained from them – modern life and the foundation -making material of modern war. Fighter jet, missilesElectric vehicles, drones, wind turbines, and even data centers also depend on the high-demonstration magnets made from these important minerals. By restricting its flow, Beijing not only flexed its industrial muscles, it revealed the rest of the dangerous vulnerability of the US and the world. China’s latest action Show American and global dependence their readiness and ability to make weapons.

This is not a new challenge. The United States has known for more than 15 years that its significant mineral supply chains were very centered, very delicate, and were exposed to Chinese leverage and control. And yet, during the democratic and Republican administration, we have failed to respond with urgency or harmony. Now, the results of those failures have caught us from the neck and are cascading in our commercial and defense areas.

After London talks, Washington and Beijing announced on Friday A new trade structure Under which China will approve the export license to the rare Earth in the next six months. American officials have publicly enhanced success – but have presented some details about what was given in return. This unanswered major questions leave: What were the American business-bands? How will the deal be implemented? And what happens when six months are up?

Doubtism is high. Ford recently stopped production at its Chicago plant due to a magnet deficiency-it also underlines that short-term supply interruptions are also real consequences. Paper agreement is not the supply chain solution. Without transparency, timely approval and long -term plan, it can easily become another diplomatic cycle of one step back, two steps back, two steps back.

Even it carries limited recurrence risks. Dozens of companies in Europe and North America have described China’s export license process as highly aggressive Ferms require detailed production data, final-use application, convenience images, customer names and transactions history. Some applicants have been denied not to provide photos or documents of their last users.

Officials say the amount of the process is “official information extraction”.

While firms are advised not to share sensitive IP, leaving the main details can mean indefinite delay. For companies in defense supply chains, implications are worrisome: valuable commercial intelligence can be used to map, disrupt pricing or carry out Chinese options.

This is not just licensing – it is competitive monitoring. And until the US creates a safe, independent capacity in the supply chain of vital minerals, it remains in contact with both disruption and data risk.

This vulnerability did not happen overnight. For many years, we have been looking at the debris of this slow-motion train. In 2010, China cut the rare earth exports in Japan during a maritime dispute, a clear warning celebrated the US but stopped the brush. In 2014, the Obama administration won a WTO case against China’s export sanctions, but wrongly assumed that legal success would manipulate further.

What Trump, Biden has done

The Trump administration identified the rare earth significantly, but especially exempted them from the 2018 China tariff, perhaps an unspecified acceptance of American dependence. Biden took the most structured approach to date: Executive Order 14017, Critical Minerals Working Group, and Funding from IIJA and IRA. A strategic partnership such as the Minerals Security Partnership emerged. But progress was slow, delayed and disrupted by allowing unequal colleagues to allow commitments.

The second Trump administration has returned with more aggressive measures, implements Section 232, activates the Defense Production Act, and promotes major funds in FY 2016. A National Energy Dominance Council now coordinates efforts. Nevertheless, these remedies, such as the recurrence of six months of China, is still less than dislike Beijing’s grip. And significantly, the defense sector has been cut, in which no such licensing window is available.

The recent G7 summit in Canada outlined the global stakes. European Commission Chairman Ursula von Der Leyen Accused of “making arms” directly China On major materials such as rare earth, a joint G7 is calling for a reaction. Results: A G7 important mineral action planAlthough China was not named after the name, the subtract was infallible. The plan explains the G7 members to increase the ESG and traceability standards for major resources; Cut capital for new projects in significant mineral mining and processing; And cooperate on innovation in recycling, replacement and purification technologies.

Mainly, Beijing reacted with anger. The Chinese Foreign Ministry dismissed the plan for protectionism as “an excuse”, claiming that the G7 was inciting a conflict for fear of losing a stake in the market.

Brussels are now indicating that business talks with Beijing have stalled effectively, so Chinese vengeance obstacles – especially against the European Union – are growing. If China doubles, it risk pushing more tightly into the European Union, Japan, South Korea and India in Washington’s orbit – well expected to avoid Beijing.

China’s major condition in rare earth mining

The raw number staggers. China accounts for about 70% of the global rare Earth mining, but more than 90% of a refining capacity. It produces 92% of the world’s Neodimium-Ayron-Boron (NDFEB) magnets-from everything to Teslas. This dominance is not an accident. China subsidized processing, focuses on global acquisition in the supply chain, and increases production much faster than the West and can release permits for the same mine.

We like sites MP content‘Mountain passes and round top downstream remain incomplete without processing. Dod and Doe offer grants, and FY2026 seems to be to extend the safe access to the Trump CAII mining capacity and vital minerals. But all this remains dwarf with the beginning of China’s head and prolonged industrial command-and-control.

China moved quickly and decisively in Africa and Latin America, partnership with governments in Democratic Republic of Congo, Bolivia and Chile; Investing in refining ports, rail and infrastructure. Conversely, these sets of issues have American efforts and engagement pieces and values-genre, giving priority to transparency and governance, in fact, but giving limited speed of important mineral issues. Even with Ukraine and Democratic Republic of Congo, the recent mousse, now, symbolic, is interrupted by conflict and instability in those countries.

London talks and recent trade deal progress bought time. But time without a strategy is not fruitful. China’s licensing regime remains intact, its data demands without any demand. The defense sector remains closed. Meanwhile, Congress’ threats to cancel clean energy and industrial policy funding can prevent rare-earth projects such as they receive traction.

This is a decisive moment. China is betting that America’s internal divisions – labor, industry, environmentalists, tribalists and political groups – will prevent the integrated, continuous effort required to compete. They can be correct. America needs to prove them wrong.

Important minerals are geopolitical power

The United States should now behave important minerals not as items, but as a device of geo -political power. China already does. To avoid its grip will require more than mine permits and short -term funding. It demands a consistent, long -term strategy to create a complete supply chain that includes not only domestic abilities but also reliable colleagues and partners. From mining and refining to magnet production and recycling, each link should be strengthened through targeted investment, permission for improvement and strategic coordination.

A successful and sustainable policy requires a commitment to the next from a presidential post. Nor can the US only take the risk of attaching allies and partners with rhetoric. Countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo, Chile and Indonesia (among others) require continuous partnership supported by financing, technology transfer and investment of significant infrastructure, not only our lectures on governance.

Six months exports from China are not a solution-this is a stress test. It explains whether America may finally focus and function, or whether it will retreat again with decency. Beijing is betting that it will be the latter. Washington should respond with a strategy equal to the scale of urge, unity and challenge. There is still time, but not much.

,By ExistenceManaging Director and Senior Policy Analyst in Longview Global, and a CNBC contributor